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Moral Hazard and MeritRatingoverTime:
An Analysisof OptimalIntertemporal
WageStructures
W.KIP VISCUSI
University
of Chicago, Chicago,Illinois
and Northwestern
Evanston,Illinois
University,

I. Introduction
A fundamental
problemthathas beenthefocusofmuchworkin agencytheoryhas been the
designof contractsto provideinsuranceto risk-averse
agentsand to elicitappropriatelevels
ofeffort.'In thecontextof insurance,theproblemis viewedas one ofmoralhazardwhereby
the insuredagent will reducethe level of his precautionsto preventan accidentif he is
insuredagainstthe adverseoutcome. In the labor marketcontext,the problemis one of
workincentiveswhileat the same timepromotingtherisk-sharing
eleprovidingeffective
mentof contracts.The overallstructureof theanalysesis quite similarwhetheror notthe
focusis on theinsurancemarket,thelabor market,or principal-agent
problemsin general.
For concreteness,
thispaper addressesthelabor marketincentivesproblem.
The labormarketproblemis complicatedbythefirm'sinabilityto observetheworker's
to makemore
and also bystochasticelementsthatimpedea firm's
attempts
abilityand effort
efforts.This
indirectinferencesusing outputto assess the worker'sproductivity-related
and theneed to createincentivestakeson added importancein
combinationofuncertainty
the case of workerswho are risk-averse.The presenceof riskaversionoftenmitigatesthe
emphasisthefirmcan place on incentivecreation,as thereis a desireon thepartofworkers
to have stableincomestreams.Completeequalizationof one's incomelevelacross statesto
rewardsneeded to providean
promoteinsurancewill, however,removethe differential
incentiveforindividualsto expendeffort.
ofcontracts
This inevitabletradeoff
betweentheworkincentiveand insurancefunction
has been studiedin detailforsingle-periodcontracts.The focusof myanalysisherewillbe
on how theseinfluencesaffectthe multi-peiiodwage structure.Althoughtherehas been
incentivesproblem2and on theroleof moralhazard in multiresearchon themulti-period
on theoptimaldesignof a meritratingsystemover
thereis no literature
periodcontexts,3
1. For generalreviewsoftheseissues,see Arrow[1] and Prattand Zeckhauser[9]. Otherresearchdealingwith
thisclass ofissuesincludesthepapersbyArrow[2], Ehrlichand Becker[3], Pauly[7, 8], Shavell[11, 12],Spenceand
Zeckhauser[13], and Viscusi[15].
2. The mostrecentpaperofthistyreis thatof Rogerson[10].
3. See, in particular,
Viscusi[15].
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timeforsituationsin whichthe principalis learningabout theagent'sriskinessovertime,
elementinvolvedin meritrating.
whichis thefundamental
in sectionII, I analyzetheproperties
of
Afterintroducing
theanalysisof workereffort
for
in
III
and
the
section
structure
themulti-period
explore implications multi-period
wage
issueswill
structure
wage contractsin sectionsIV and V. Considerationofthemulti-period
proveto be consequentialfortwo reasons.First,thesteepnessoftheearningsprofilewillbe
alteredovertimedependingon theworker'sinitialproductivity.
Second,therelativerewards
acrossstatesin period2 followinganyparticularoutcomewillalso be affected.In short,the
entirestructureof subsequentcompensationbecomesalteredso as to generatemoreeffectiveworkincentivesin theinitialperiod.
II. The WorkEffortDecision
is uncertaingivenany levelof work
Considera situationin whichtheworker'sproductivity
is high
on his behalf.I willassumethatin each periodeithertheworker'sproductivity
effort
of
The
state
of
a
lower
level
with
or he is unproductive,
productivity. particular
productivity
but not completelydeterthatoccurs is a stochasticeventinfluencedby his workeffort,
about theworker'sfuture
minedbyit. Boththeemployerand workersharethisuncertainty
state
thatoccurs.The roleof
monitor
the
of
them
can
each
and
productivity
productivity,
that
state
a
will
is to enhancetheprobability
the worker'seffort
p (e)
prevail,in whichcase
theworkeris productive,where
p' > 0 and p" < 0
outcomeformat,thereis no loss of
in the initialperiod.Withinsuch a binaryproductivity
in settingtheworker'soutputat 1 iftheproductivestatea prevailsand at 0 ifthe
generality
stateb holds.
unproductive
I will assume thatthereare only two periodsto the worker'schoice
For simplicity,
problem.This time horizonis long enough to permitthe role of learningbut sufficiently
shortso thatit is possibleto finda closed formsolutionto the workerchoice problem.In
the second period the workermustmake a similareffortchoice exceptthatthe assessed
acbased on theinformation
thattheworkerwillbe productivemaybe different
probability
in
In
a
of
situation heterogeneous
workers,
quiredabout theworker'sproductivity period 1.
whetheror not the workeris productiveinitiallywill provideinformation
regardingthe
cannotbe monitoreddirectly
worker'sunderlying
ability.In addition,thelevelofworkeffort
on
will
be
based
observedperformance,
not
rewards
so thatto createeffective
incentives
workerinput.
in theinitialperiodwillinfluencetheperceivedprobability
The worker'sproductivity
thatthe workerwill be productivein the second period. The subscripts will denotethe
values of variablesconditionalon an initialsuccessfuljob experience,and the subscript
outcome (i.e., a
f will denote variable values conditionalon an unfavorablefirst-period
failure).
on thedistribution
ofworkerabilitiesand therelationbetweenwork
Usinginformation
boththeemployerand workerforma conditionalprobability
and productivity,
effort
p, (es)
thattheworkerwho expendseffort
e, willbe productivein period2 afteran initialsuccess
(i.e., statea), where
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Table I. Summaryof Wage ContractNotation
Period I
Wage in State a
Wage in State b
Probabilitythat
State a Occurs

Period 2 afterSuccess

Period 2 afterFailure

Wa

Xa

wb

Xb

Ya
Yb

p(e)

ps(es)

pf(ef)

ps' > 0 and ps, < 0.
in period 1,thechanceof
Similarly,afteran initialfailurewheretheworkeris unproductive
beingproductivein period2 is governedbypf(ef), where

p; > 0, pf'< 0,
and
pf(ey) < P, (es)
= ef.4
es
To provideworkerswithappropriateincentivesthefirmestablishesa contingentcontractwherebytheworkeris paid a wage thatvariesdependingbothon his productivity
and
on
the
as
well.
No
restrictions
will
be
on
this
structure
since
the
possibly
period
placed
wage
focusof the articleis on what factorswill governthe natureof the wage contract.In the
initialperiod the wage paymentsin states a and b are wa and Wb. Followingan initial
success,the wage pair is givenby xa and xb forthesetwo states,and followingan initial
failuretheyare Ya and Yb. The rewardsstructure
is summarizedin Table I.
The assumptionthatthe firmcan varythe wage rate based on the worker'spast and
is in thegeneralspiritofthekindof wage flexibility
previousproductivity
argumentsundermodels.
For
the
of
in thepresence
contracts
lyingagencytheory
example, analysis optimal
of cyclicalrisksby Hall and Lazear [4] involvesa similarrangeof complexitiesin termsof
thedesignof efficient
contracts.Completeleewayin termsofthefirm'sabilityto setworker
wages may not alwaysbe presentifthe wage is tied to thejob ratherthanthe worker.5In
such a context,one could recastthemodelin termsofthefirm'sabilityto assignworkersto
jobs (and consequentlysetwages) costlessly,butthedegreeof discretionthefirmmayhave
in practicemay be limited.To the extentthatsuch impedimentsexist,one can view the
marketsreferencepointwhichideallyfirmsshould
analysishere as providingan efficient
attemptto achieveifit is nottoo costlyto do so.
Workerpreferences
Z (M, e) fordifferent
outcomesdependpositivelyon themonetary
rewardM and negativelyon the levelof effort
e. I will assume thatthisutilityfunctionis
additivelyseparableand is of theform6
if

Z(M, e) = U(M) - E(e).
4. The situationof sharedinformation
is also assumedto be one of firm-specific
information.
Experimentation
thatalso influences
theworker's
elsewherecan be modeledsimilarly,
as in Viscusi[14].
productivity
5. See Williamson,
and Harris[16] foran extensive
discussionofthesourcesofimpediments
to efficient
Wachter,
wagecontracts.
6. The implicationsof additiveseparability
formulti-attribute
are exploredin Keeneyand
utilityfunctions
Raiffa[5].
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withrespectto monetarygambles,or
The workeris assumedto be risk-averse
U'

0 and U"<O 0.

In addition,thereis increaseddisutility
associatedwithhigherlevelsof effort,
or
E'>O 0and E" >0.
allocationis commonto bothstates,theworker'sexpectedutilityV in
Since theeffort
I
is
givenby
period
V= p(e)U(wa) + [1-p(e)]U(Wb) - E(e).
The expectedutilityin period2 followinga productiveoutcomein period 1 is givenby
Vs = ps,(es)U(xa) +

[1--ps(es)]U(Xb)
outcomeit is
and followingan unproductive

- E(es),

Vf= pf(ef)U(ya) + [I -pf (ef)]U(Yb) - E(ef).
In each period the worker'stask is to select his optimallevel of effort.In period 1,
not onlyaffectsthelevelof V,but it also influencesthechancethatthe
however,thiseffort
second
pertinent
periodrewardswillbe governedby V,or Vf.Because oftheseinterdepenone
solve the work effortproblemwith standarddynamicprogramming
must
dencies,
methods.
If theworkeris productiveinitially,
in period2 he willpickes to maximizehis value of
thechoiceof e* is that
V,. The conditiongoverning
0=

(1)
ps'[U(Xb) U(Xa)] EI'.
Equation 1 definesthe value of e* thatleads to theoptimal Vs*.The workercontinuesto
untiltheincreasedexpectedutility
fromraisingthechancethatstatea prevails
expendeffort
is just offsetby the added disutility
associated withgreaterworkeffort.Similarly,forthe
thattheworkerset
optimalef,one has therequirement
0 = Pf'[ U(ya) - U(yb)] - Ef'.

(2)

The value of V/*
theexpectedutilityevaluatedtheef*value thatsatisfies
represents
equation
(2).
The worker'sinitialeffort
choiceis to pick theeffort
levelto maximizehis discounted
expectedutilityW overbothperiods.Let thediscountfactor0 be theinverseofone plus the
interestrate.Consequently,he will
Max W= V +

p (e) Vs*+

[1-p(e)]Vf*,

or he willpicke to maximizehis currentexpectedutilityplus theinfluencehispresenteffort
has on discountedexpectedfutureutilitythroughitseffect
on theprobability
thattheworker
is initiallyproductive.
The resultingoptimaleffort
conditionis that7
0 = p'[U(wa)

- U(Wb) +? (V,- Vf)]- E'.

7. The second-order
conditions
are also satisfied
hereand fores and efaboveas well.

(3)
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Workeffort
is increaseduntilitsmarginaldisutility
that
just equals theincreasedprobability
theproductivestatea willoccur,multipliedby theadded immediateand deferredrewards
associatedwiththisoutcome.Since V,exceeds Vf,thedynamicaspectsofthewage structure
willgivetheworkeran incentiveto workharderthanhe otherwisewould.
The within-period
incentiveeffectsshowa consistentpatternin all threecases. Upon
ofequations(1-3), one can showthatboostingthewage associatedwith
totaldifferentiation
incentivein thatperiod,or
a productiveworkoutcomeenhancestheproductivity-related
Oe/8wa > 0, aes /8xa > 0, and aef /8ya > 0,

and raisingthestateb wage lowerstheincentiveto be productive:
e/8wb< O, des /8xb< 0, and ef/8yb< 0.
Workersrespondin theexpectedfashionto contemporaneous
wage incentives.
The influenceofdeferred
compensationon immediateincentivesis somewhatdifferent.
Here theprincipalconcernforgeneratingworkincentivesis notwhichstateprevailsin the
secondperiodbuthow thispaymentis linkedto whetheror nottheworkeris productivein
period 1. As a result,bothwage paymentsin period2 followingan initialsuccesswillboost
as
workereffort,

a el/xa > 0 and a el/xb > 0.
or
Similarly,higherwages afteran unproductive
experiencelowerinitialeffort,
Se/8ya< 0 and a e/8yb < 0.
decisionthatwillestablishthe
It is theselinkagesof subsequentwages to the initialeffort
as an incentive-generating
device.
thetemporalwage structure
rationaleformanipulating
cannot be ascertainedin general.For
The relativemagnitudeof the incentiveefforts
example,

ae/8wa= [p'U'(wa)]/(-2Wlae2),
and
ae/8xa = [fps U'(xa)]/(-&2W/8e2).
on the relationbetweeneffortand the probabilitythat the
Withoutfurtherrestrictions
workerwillbe productiveas wellas otherfeaturesof thechoiceproblem,one cannotascerThat thereshould
tain whetherwa or xa willbe moreimportantin inducingworkereffort.
be such an ambiguityin and of itselfis somewhatsurprisingsince it suggeststhatfuture
than
may be moreeffective
compensationcontingenton the worker'sinitialproductivity
initial
Similar
on
the
worker's
ambiguities
productivity.
presentcompensationcontingent
pertainto theotherwage variablesas well. In situationswheretheperiod2 chanceof being
p, is high,thevalue ofxa willbe moreimportant(and xb willbe less important).
productive
will
to currenteffort
Increasesin theresponsiveness
probability
p' oftheinitialproductivity
boost the roleof wa. The otherwage parameterstake on importancethatvariesin similar
fashion.Deferredcompensationdoes not play a role thatis necessarilydominantor subsidiary,but its relativeimportancewilldependon theparticularcircumstances.

MORAL HAZARD AND MERIT RATING

1073

III. OptimalMulti-Period
WageStructures
The Firm'sDecision Problem
Workers'effort
parametersof the labor contractwillbe
responseswithrespectto different
takenintoaccountby a firmwhenmakingitschoiceofthewage structure.In thissectionI
will firstformulatethe firm'sobjectivefunctionand thenexploretheoptimality
conditions
and theirimplicationsforthefirm'swage structure.
In each period,the firm'sexpectedprofitsequal the difference
betweenthe expected
the
that
the
worker
is
probability
output (i.e.,
productivemultipliedby his productivity,
whichis 1) and theexpectedwage bill. In period 1,expectedprofits
are
rrl =p - pwa - (1-p)Wb ;
in period2 followingan initiallyproductiveoutcome,expectedprofits
are
s=

Ps

-

psXa

-

(1-ps)Xb ;

secondperiodexpectedprofits
outcomeare
finally,
followingan unproductive
=
rf- Pf PfYa - (I-pf)yb .
The Multi-PeriodOptimalityConditions
The appropriatewage structurewill hingein parton whethertheworkerremainswiththe
firmin period2. Followingan initialsuccessfuloutcome,it willnotbe optimalforeitherthe
has
employeror the workerto terminatethe watch.8The worker'sexpectedproductivity
increased,and thereis assumedto be no changein his externaljob prospectsbecause any
is assumed to be firm-specific.
information
The
acquired about the worker'sproductivity
workerwillnot quit providedthatthefirmdoes notlowerthewage level--a resultthatwill
be shownto be truebelow.
The workermay,however,quit afteran unfavorableoutcomesincethe employermay
lowerhis wage to takeintoaccounttheworker'slowerexpectedproductivity.
For theinitial
modelto be considered,I willassumethatthealternativewage is not sufficiently
attractive
to induceworkerquitting.Relaxingthisassumptionhas onlya minoreffect.9
The firm'sprofits
per workeroverthetwo periodsare givenby
r = rr +

prs + f(l 1-p)rf ,

or
7r= p + fPPs + 0 (1-p)pf - pwa - (1-p)Wb - I3PPsXa
- 8p (1-ps)Xb - .(1-P)PfYa P- (1-p)(--pf)yb .
In competitive
thevalue of w willbe drivento zero.
equilibrium,
The firm'staskis to designa wage structure
thatwillmaximizetheworker'sdiscounted
8. This resultis derivedmoreformally
forthespecific
information
case considered
herein Viscusi[14].
9. In particular,
if workerscan quit and go to anotherfirm,it providesa utilityfloorafteran unfavorable
job
and removesYa and Ybas choicevariables.The spiritoftheremaining
resultsis unaffected.
experience
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reactionfunctionsderivedin sectionII and the zero
expectedutility,subjectto the effort
whereX is its shadowprice.More specifically,
thefirmwill
profitconstraint,
Max G = V + 3pVs +

Wa b,xa
Xb'Ya' h

l(1-p)Vf - XAr.

withrespectto each ofthesix wage variablesleads,aftersome simplifiDifferentiating
to
the
cation,
followingconditions:
U'(wa) = -A [1 - (I /p)

(rr /e)(Oe/8wa)];
U'(wb) = -X [1 - (1 /( -p))
e) (8 e /8wb)];
(8rr/
U'(xa) = - [ 1 - (1 l/p)(rs/ es) ( es /xa)
- (1 /lpps) (rr /8e) (8 e /8xa)];
U'(Xb)

and

(5)

(6)

-- [1 -- (I /(1-ps)) (rr / es) ( es/xb)
- (1 /fp(1-ps))(8 r/8e)(8e /xb)];

U'(Ya)

(4)

= -

(7)

[1 - (1 /pf)(arf /ef) (ef lya)

- (1/P3(I1-p)pf)(8/rr8e)(e/lya)];

(8)

U'*(yb) -X [1 - (l/(-pf))(Of/ aef)(O ef/8yb)
- (1 /
(9)
la e) (8e /yb)].
(1--p) (1-pf)) (8r
conditionsforthechoiceof first-period
Equations(4) and (5), whichare thefirst-order
condiin thattheyare identicalto thewage structure
efficiency
wages,are also noteworthy
in the
tionsthatwouldprevailifthefirmweremyopicin itswage policy.The onlydifference
is
that
results
to
rather
than
over
both
myopic
profits
periods,
rrpertains singleperiodprofits
and theshadowpriceX maydiffer.
A principalroleofequations(4) and (5) belowwillbe to
differs.
providea reference
pointto ascertainhow themulti-period
wage structure
in thattheyindicatethatworkerswillnot
In addition,theseequationsare noteworthy
be fullyinsuredagainstincomeriskssincethemarginalutilityof wa and wbmaydiffer.
The
optimalwage contractwillsacrificesomeoftheriskspreadingcapabilityin orderto preserve
appropriateworkincentives.Unlikethefullinsurancecase, themarginalutilityof incomeis
for
notequalized acrossstates.The generalspiritof thisresultis consistentwiththefindings
relatedclassesofagencytheorymodels,suchas thatof Spence and Zeckhauser[ 13],among
others.
fromtheirfirstperiodcounThe conditionsfortheoptimalperiod2 wage levelsdiffer
of
in
of
the
role
the second periodwages in
the
addition
(4-5)
through
terparts equations
and
initial
incentives.
Since
xb followinga successfulproduchigherwages Xa
influencing
thelevelsofthesewagesis boostedand the
tivityexperiencebothaugmentinitialincentives,
associatedmarginalutilityof thewage paymentsis lowerthanit would otherwisebe.
The oppositeresultoccursin thecase ofya and yb. Higherwage levelsin thisinstance
in theinitialperiod.As a consequence,
woulddampena worker'sincentiveto expendeffort
of thesewages willtendto reducethesewage levelsbelow
the backwarddisincentiveeffect
theamountsthatwould have prevailedifwage contractsweredesignedon a singleperiod
basis.
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of multi-period
contracts
elicitation
will
Becausetheincreasedincentive
capability
a
of
will
the
there
be
boosttheoveralllevelofeffort
e,
dampening
marginal
productivity
of additionaleffort,
8r /8e. To theextentthathigherlevelsof wa and wbalso havea
areutilized,
theoverallimpactwillbe
effect
on e as theotherwagecomponents
diminishing
incentives
mechanism.
to reducetherelianceon initialwageratesas theexclusive

IV. The Design of EfficientWage Structures
Implicationsfor the TemporalWageStructure

becomesmoreapparent
effects
Theroleoftheseincentive
upontakingratiosofthemarginal
statein theinitial
The tilting
overtimebetweenthepost-success
conditions.
optimality
is
by
period governed
U' (xa) /U' (Wa) = [1 - (1 /ps)
(rrs / es) (a es/xa)
- (1 /fpps)(r la/e) (8 e /xa)]/
[1 - (Ip)(8rr /8e)(8e/8wa)]

(10)

and
U'(Xb) /U'(Wb)

=

[1 - ( /(I-ps))(rs

laes)(a eslb)

- (1 /fp(1-ps)) (8 la/e) ( e /xb)]
[1 - (1/(l1-p))(8rr/8e)(8e/8wb)].

(11)

ofequations(10) and(11) distinguish
theseequations
from
Thefinalterminthenumerators
their
in
whatwouldhavebeenobtainedby takingtheratiousing
myopiccounterparts
effect
on initialeffort
e, whichin
equation(4) and (5). Sincebothxa andxbhavea positive
of
the
lowers
the
numerathe
feature
turnraisesprofits
contracting
problem
7r, multi-period
torin each case. The ratioof U' (xa) to U' (wa) willbe lowered,as willtheratioof U' (Xb)to

withthewagelevel,theultimate
diminishes
Sincetheworker's
marginal
utility
a successso as to augment
initial
is to boostthewagelevelin bothstatesfollowing
effect
workincentives.
first
an unproductive
a
Therelative
periodaredetermined
wageratefollowing
through
as onehastheresultthat
similarprocedure,
U'(Wb).

= [1 - (1 /pf)(7rrf
l/ef)( e /ya)
U'(ya) /U'(wa)
- (1j/(1-p)pf)(87r/8e)(8e/8ya)]/
[1 - (1/(1-p))(8rr/8e)(8e/8wa)],

(12)

and
U'(yb) /U'(wb)

=

[1 - (1 /(1-p))(8rr / ef)( ef/8yb)
-

(1/13(1--p)(1--p))(8rr/8e)(Oe/8yb)]/
[1 - (1/(1-p))(8rr/8e)(8e/8yb)].

(13)
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In thiscase the deferredcompensationhas a disincentiveeffectin each instance,as both
e /8y,aand e /8ybare negative.The finaltermsin the numerators
of equations(12) and
(13) are consequentlypositive,implyingthatthe relativemarginalutilitiesof y, and yb
will be greater.These highermarginalutilitiesin
comparedto theirperiod 1 counterparts
turnimplya lowerwage levelfollowingan unproductive
job outcome,as theoverallwage
structure
followinga period 1 failureis loweredto providegreaterinitialincentivesforthe
workerto be productive.
In termsof thetiltingof thewage structureovertime,one would expectsome tilting
whollyapart fromtheseincentiveeffects.If contractsbrokeeven on a withinperiodbasis,
wageswould risefollowinga productiveoutcomesincep, exceedsp. Similarly,
wageswould
fallafteran unproductive
outcomesincepf is belowp. Whattheresultshereindicateis that
this tiltingof the wage structurewill be augmentedby the desireto use period 2 wages
to createinitialincentives.The wage increasefollowinga success will be greaterand the
declinein the wage structurefollowinga failurewill be steeperthan it would otherwise
be. In effect,the extentof meritratingis by an amountthatis morethan is dictatedby
actuariallyfairconsiderations.
ratesof insurancein the agent'scontractwould be
The likelihoodthatthe effective
modifiedbased on thefirstperiodexperienceis not surprising.What is strikingis thatthe
is greaterthan would be dictatedby withinperiodactuarially
extentof the modifications
faircontracts.
The optimalityof a discrepancybetweenthespot wage and theworker'sproductivity
willemergebecause ofthenatureofthedynamicincentivesproblem.In situationsofuncereffects
thedirectionof theseincentive-enhancing
will dependon
tain workerproductivity,
and also on theneed to promotetheinsurancefunctionof
theworker'sinitialproductivity
contracts,whichwill be consideredsubsequently.
This tiltingof the wage structurearises in otherlabor marketcontextsas well. For
example,in Lazear [6] it is shownthatthefirmwilloffera steeperage-earningsprofilethan
is warrantedin orderto preventworkershirking.In thatmodel,the firmwithholdssome
wages untilfutureperiodsand terminatestheworkerif he shirks,leadinghimto lose the
deferred
wages.The analysishereindicatesthatthisresultgeneralizesto a situationin which
thereis underlyinguncertainty
about theworker'sproductivity
coupled withriskaversion
of
on the partof theworker.More importantis thatthereis a considerablestrengthening
of
the
current
was
In
his
the
theLazear result.
independent
wage
analysis, contemporaneous
outputlevelso thatit could onlybe throughfuturewage adjustmentsthatincentivescould
be created.The analysispresentedhere indicatesthateven when firstperiod wages are
made contingenton the worker'sfirstperiod output level that it is desirableto use the
as well to createworkincentives.
secondperiodwage structure
Across-StateDifferences
Ifworkerswererisk-neutral,
one couldpromoteinitialincentivesquiteeffectively
bymaking
thewage w, sufficiently
greaterthanwb.Extremewage lotteriesofthistypeare notdesirable
in generalbecauseofthepresenceofworkerriskaversion,whichcreatesa desireon thepart
outwithgreaterequalityacrossdifferent
of workersto have a wage structure
productivity
comes. This need to promoteriskspreadingwill mutethe incentiveeffectof contractsas
and theinsurancefunction,
betweentheincentiveeffects
thereis a need to make a tradeoff
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ornotthewagestructure
whether
as wasnotedinsectionIII. HereI willconsider
dynamics
ofthewagestructure
acrossstates.
leadto greater
equalization
Considerfirst
thewagestructure
a successful
following
expeperiod1 productivity
structure
istointroduce
thefinal
contract
considerations
rience.Theroleofthemulti-period
workincentives
terminequations(6) and (7). Sincethewagexa willexceedxbto promote
in period 2, the value of U' (xa) will be below U'(Xb). The introductionof the dynamic
termswillnarrow
themarginal
differences
incentive
between
thetwostatesif
utility
(1 /lpps)(r/ la e) (a e /xa) < (1 /fPp
(1-p)) (8rr/8e) (8 e /8xb),

(14)

thatreducesto
to a condition

U'(Xa) < U'(xb).
The finaltermswillconsequently
thatthemardampenthemarginal
utility
gap provided
of moneyis greater
in stateb. The finaltermsin equations(6) and (7) could
ginalutility
neverequalizethemarginal
sincea strict
wouldholdin equation
difference
utility
equality
(14) if U' (x,) equalled U' (xb). Withthesetermsbeingidentical,whetheror nottheratioof
U' (xa) to U'(xb) exceeded I would be governedby the myopicconditions,whichlead to
greaterx, and consequentlylower U'(xa). Similarly,thedynamicaspectscould neverproduce the resultthat U'(xb) < U'(xa) since such marginalutilitieswould reversethe inequalitysignin equation(14), makingit evenmoredesirableto raisexa, makingU'(xa)

evenlowerthanU'(xb). As a result,
themulti-period
concerns
willnarrow,
wagestructure
themarginal
butnotcompletely
eliminate
x, andxb,
utility
gap between
Afteran adverseinitialproductivity
thegap betweenya and ybwillbe
experience,
if
final
inequations(8) and (9) satisfy
incentive
the
terms
widenedbythedynamic
effects
(1

or

/9(1--p)pf)(8

e)(e/ lyb),
la/e)(8e/8ya)> (1
/f(1--p)(1--pf))(8rra
U'(ya) < U'(yb).

Providedthaty, exceedsyb,whichwouldbe impliedbythemyopic
conditions,
optimality
the period2 wagegap following
the multi-period
exacerbates
incentive
an
component
The
is
in
adverseproductivity
the
direction
of
the
across
state
effect
experience.
opposite
a successful
becausethey, andYbtermshavea negadifferences
following
job experience
tiveinfluence
on initialeffort
thus
e, whereasthexa and xbwageshavea positiveeffect,
fortheoppositesignsthatresult.
accounting
The intuition
eachresultis quitesimilar.
The incentive
is drivenin
effect
underlying
the
of
income
in
a
When
state.
levelsare
partby marginal
utility
particular
utility
marginal
the
associated
rate
a
will
have
effect
on
work
incentives.
In the
high,altering
wage
greater
absence of any dynamicinfluences,
thestateb wage willbe lowerthanthestatea wage and
the associated marginalutilitywill be greater.Higherwage ratesfollowinga productive
initialperiodwillaugmentinitialincentivesand thehigherU' (xb) bolstersthisinfluenceso
in theperiod2 wagesresults.Similarly,higherperiod2 wagesfollowing
thata narrowing
an
job outcomelowerinitialworkincentives.The highermarginalutilityassounproductive
ciatedwithU' (yb) consequently
thatitis even
impliesa greaterdisincentive
implying
effect,
moreimportant
to loweryb in relationto ya.
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As inthecaseofwagetilting,
theeffects
areintheoppositedirection
onthe
depending
initialproductivity
outcome.The dynamic
elements
narrowthegap betweenU'(xa) and
U' (xb) andwidenthegapbetweenU' (ya) and U' (yb). Theconcern
withdynamic
incentive
effects
the
risk
in
one
case
and
conflicts
this
with objective
in
objective
promotes
spreading
theothersituation.
V. Conclusion
and riskaversion,
labormarketcontracts
In situations
of uncertain
workerproductivity
andriskspreading.
A trade-off
havea dualobjective
ofpromoting
incentives
between
these
is present
modelsthatwere
insingleperiodmodelsas wellas inthemulti-period
objectives
thefocusofthispaper.Whenthereis morethana singleperiod,therewillbe a divergence
and thespotexpectedwagerateas the
betweenthewithinperiodexpectedproductivity
the
creation
ofworkincentives.
In effect,
firms
is
will
structure
utilized
to
promote
wage
on an actuarially
unfairbasiswhenviewedwithinthecontextofthe
meritrateworkers
secondperiod.
or not
on whether
as theimpactdiffers
No singletypeofinfluence
results,
depending
an
of
initial
is productive
the
initial
theworker
in
period beingproductive,
period.Following
willslopeupwardmorethanit otherwise
thewagestructure
wouldand therewillbe a
afteran
states.Similarly,
withinperiodgap in the wagesacrossproductivity
narrower
risk
in
accentuated
and
the
the
will
be
adverseproductivity
outcome, drop wages
spreading
reduced.The commonelementin eachof
ofthesecondperiodwagecontract
properties
In addition,the
to promoteincentives.
thesecases is a relianceon thewage structure
insingleperiodmodelsextends
riskandincentives
thatis present
intrinsic
trade-off
between
of
someoftheriskspreading
to multiple
capability
periodsas thereis a desireto sacrifice
in
incentives
an
bolster
the
work
earlier
two
to
period.
period compensation
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